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Abstract: Kirk Durston recently presented an argument aimed against evidential
arguments from evil predicated on instances of suffering that appear to be
gratuitous; ‘The consequential complexity of history and gratuitous evil ’, Religious
Studies, 36 (2000), 65–80. He begins with the notion that history consists of an
intricate web of causal chains, so that a single event in one such chain may have
countless unforeseen consequences. According to Durston, this consequential
complexity exhibited by history negatively impacts on our grasp of the data
necessary to determine whether or not an evil is gratuitous. He therefore concludes
that our epistemic condition poses an insurmountable barrier towards the inference
from inscrutability to pointlessness. By way of reply, I contend that Durston’s
argument is flawed in two significant respects, and thus the evidential argument
emerges unscathed from his critique.
With the demise of logical arguments from evil, greater attention came to
be focused on evidential arguments, particularly those beginning from our obser-
vations of seemingly pointless, horrific evil. For over a decade, however, eviden-
tial arguments have been subjected to a concerted and formidable critique in the
hands of ‘sceptical theists’. According to this group of theists, our impoverished
cognitive condition precludes us from justifiably inferring from the inscrutability
of instances of evil that there are in fact evils that have no point. In ‘The con-
sequential complexity of history and gratuitous evil ’,1 Kirk Durston has lent his
support to this position by way of an argument that is somewhat unique in the
sceptical theist literature. I intend to show, however, that Durston’s argument fails
to further the sceptical theist cause. I will begin with an outline of Durston’s case
against evidential arguments, before proceeding to identify two ways in which his
reasoning has lead him astray.
Durston’s argument from the complexity of history
The central premise in Durston’s argument is that history is ‘con-
sequentially complex’. By this he means that ‘history is composed of a web
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of innumerable interacting causal chains, many of which are composed of
millions of discrete events’.2 As a result, ‘changing one event not only changes the
entire causal chain from that point onward to the end of history, it also changes
the evolution of all other causal chains that interact with the revised causal
chain at any point in the future’.3 To highlight the consequential complexity of
history, Durston imagines what may have transpired had Winston Churchill’s
mother, on the night her son was conceived early in 1874, fallen asleep in a
slightly different position so that ‘the precise pathway that each of the millions
of spermatozoa took would have been slightly altered’.4 The odds are, accord-
ing to Durston, that an individual with a very different chromosomal com-
bination than Winston Churchill’s would have been born, ‘with the likely
result that the evolution of World War II would have been substantially different
from what actually took place’.5 Thus, an apparently insignificant event (the
sleeping position of Churchill’s mother on the night in question) had conse-
quences of great moral significance that could not have been recognized until
many years later.
Durston goes on to outline the implications of the complexity of history on
evidential arguments from gratuitous evil.6 He begins with the commonly ac-
cepted definition of gratuitous evil : an evil is gratuitous if and only if God could
have prevented it without forfeiting some greater good or permitting some
equally bad or worse evil. Given this definition, to determine whether a particular
evil is gratuitous we must have at our disposal two bodies of data:
(1) the instance of evil E together with its morally significant conse-
quences, and
(2) the morally significant consequences of substituting E with some
other event.
The first set of data would inform us of the negative intrinsic value of the initial
evil event along with the intrinsic values of all the consequences of that evil event
that will be actualized to the end of history. Thus, the overall net value of the
initial evil event (call it A) is the sum of all the intrinsic values, both positive and
negative, of that event together with all its actual consequences.7 Durston states
this schematically as follows:
A=E+C1+C2+C3+…Cend
However, according to the thesis of the complexity of history, a single event leads
to an exponentially increasing number of consequences, affecting an increasing
number of causal chains. Therefore, the consequences that flow from E are likely
to include billions or more discrete events. In that case, our knowledge of the
consequences of E would clearly be miniscule in comparison with the entire set
of E’s consequences to the end of history. If we were therefore asked to adopt one
of the following three positions,
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(1) A is positive;
(2) A is negative; or
(3) we do not know whether A is positive or negative,
the most rationally defensible position to take could only be (3).
A similar problem affects the second body of data relating to the consequences
of preventing E in favour of some other event. This set of data informs us of the
overall value of the best alternative that God could actualize (call this B), where
this value is the sum of the intrinsic value of S – the event that God substitutes for
E – and the intrinsic values of all the consequences of S. Put schematically:
B=S+CB1+CB2+CB3+…CB–end
Calculating the value of B, however, proves to be just as difficult as calculating the
value of A. If S takes the place of E, the consequences that follow from S would
include the subsequent decisions of free agents. In other words, the elements in
the chain CB1, CB2 and so on would mainly consist of counterfactuals of creaturely
freedom. But then to know the consequences of substituting E with S would
require nothing less than middle knowledge. Lacking such knowledge, we cannot
know what free decisions would be made subsequent to S, and so we are unable
to ascertain the value of B.
The conclusion drawn by Durston is that we cannot know what constitutes the
best alternative for God to actualize. One may agree with this, however, while
insisting that we do know of better alternatives open to God, for surely we can
imagine a world better than ours, perhaps in virtue of containing S but not E. But
Durston rejects this commonsensical assumption. He argues that if the alterna-
tive world in question (call it W) includes the decisions of free agents, then we do
not know if God can actualize W. For whether W includes S but not E is not up to
God alone, but also depends on the free decisions of W’s inhabitants. But the
inhabitants of W may never make all the necessary free decisions, under any
possible circumstances, in order to bring about S rather than E. Due to our lack of
middle knowledge, we do not know what decisions such free agents would make
and thus we do not know whether God can actualize W.8 We are therefore unable
to postulate what may constitute a better, let alone the best, alternative for God to
actualize, thus giving us further reason to think that attempts at calculating B are
doomed to failure. Once again, agnosticism over the value of B seems the most
rational position to adopt.
Durston then proceeds to show how this agnosticism leads to grave difficulties
for non-theists like Rowe and Russell who develop atheological arguments based
on gratuitous evils. To judge whether an evil is gratuitous, we must compare A
and B. More precisely, if the difference between the values of A and B is positive
(in which case, the value of E along with its consequences is greater than the value
of the alternatives), then God is justified in permitting the given evil. Conversely,
Response to Durston 453
if the difference between A and B is negative, then God is not justified in per-
mitting the evil. This suggests the following definition of gratuitous evil :
(G) An instance of evil E is gratuitous if and only if A–B is negative.9
Due to the complexity of history, however, we lack virtually all the data necessary
to determine the values of A and B. Durston compares our predicament vis-a`-vis
gratuitous evil with the attempt to establish whether A–B is positive or negative in
relation to the following problem:
A=x7+2x 3+1+2+millions of unknown numbers of unknown sign.
B=4+2+millions of additional unknown numbers of unknown sign.
Just as we could not fail to be agnostic about the sign of A–B in this case, so too
we cannot determine, with respect to any evil or group of evils, that A–B for such
evils is negative and therefore gratuitous. The complexity of history thus under-
mines evidential arguments from evil that begin with our observations of evils
that appear to be gratuitous.
Objection 1
If Durston is correct, then for any evil E that takes place in our world,
we cannot determine whether or not E is gratuitous – put differently, we cannot
determine whether or not God was justified in permitting E. And this because of
our lack of knowledge of the data necessary to make well-grounded determi-
nations of the aforementioned sort. But if this is the case with actual evil states of
affairs, why could it not also apply to actual good states of affairs? Paralleling
Durston’s argument, one may argue that we are never in a position to determine
whether God is justified in allowing a good event G to take place, for to determine
this we would need to know all the consequences that flow from G till the end
of history, as well as all the consequences of substituting G with a state of affairs
of lesser intrinsic value. Consider, however, the following patently good state of
affairs: donating money to a children’s hospital. Can we justifiably assert that
God, should He exist, would be justified in permitting this good to take place?
Apparently not, if Durston’s argument is followed to its logical conclusion.
This points to the underlying problem with Durston’s argument: it takes for
granted unreasonably high standards for making acceptable moral or evaluative
judgments. In many cases, we do not need to know the remote and indirect
consequences of a particular action or event in order to make an adequate
judgment regarding its overall value. In donating money to a charity, in providing
food and shelter to one’s children, in caring for one’s sickly grandmother, and in
numerous other instances the action in question can be deemed to good – and
thus God is justified in permitting it – regardless of our incomplete knowledge of
the consequences such actions may have in the distant future. In like manner,
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knowledge of the overall value of an evil event need not presuppose extensive
knowledge regarding its consequences. Clearly, we can justifiably assert that
many evils (e.g. lying to one’s wife, the theft of a car) are underwritten by out-
weighing goods (e.g. free will) even though we do not know the impact such evils
have on events taking place in centuries to come.
But there is an additional reason for taking remote consequences to be irrel-
evant to the question of whether a particular evil serves a greater good. It is some-
times held that God could not be justified in permitting an instance of suffering
for the sake of some good unless the sufferer partakes of that good. This view
appears to be quite plausible, at least with respect to terrible evils such as Rowe’s
E1 (the excruciating death of a fawn trapped in a forest fire) and E2 (the sexual
abuse and murder of a five-year-old girl). For as Rowe points out, ‘we normally
would not regard someone as morally justified in permitting intense, involuntary
suffering on the part of another, if that other were not to figure significantly in the
good for which that suffering was necessary’.10 Therefore, apart from goods that
can only be actualized in the afterlife (e.g. the beatific vision), any other good
must be present at some point during the sufferer’s lifetime, otherwise that per-
son will have no opportunity to share in the relevant good. If this is the case,
however, there is simply no need to examine the causal chain extending from the
death of the suffering individual to the end of history when considering what
purpose, if any, was served by the evil endured by that individual. One need only
focus on the goods that could be realized in the course of the sufferer’s life.
Considerations such as these undercut Durston’s scepticism regarding our ability
to determine whether God could have a morally sufficient reason for permitting
instances of evil.11
Objection 2
A second difficulty with Durston’s case concerns his claim that, due to a
lack of middle knowledge, we have no way of knowing whether there was an
alternative better than E that God could have actualized. As we have seen, an
objection that quickly comes to mind is that we have little trouble imagining
worlds better than ours. It therefore seems that we do know of better alternatives
that were open to God. Rowe makes this point forcefully in relation to E2:
Consider all those possible worlds with (as much as possible) the same past as the actual
world but in which God brings it about that the little girl’s attacker is so overcome
with sorrow on seeing the terror in her face that he lets her go, physically unharmed.
Undoubtedly, some of these worlds are worse than the actual world andmany are better.
Is it reasonable to believe that an omnipotent being was unable to create any of these
better worlds, rather than the actual world? It seems incredible that this should be so.12
Similarly, nearby possible worlds in which prior to New Year’s Day of 1986 (when
E2 took place) the little girl dies peacefully in her sleep or her attacker is seized by
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a fatal heart attack are clearly better alternatives, and it is difficult to see why God
would be incapable of creating one of them. To be sure, Durston does not claim
that God cannot create suchworlds, but only that we do not know if He can, due to
our lack of middle knowledge. Durston’s point here is that we simply do not know
whether, in any alternative world inhabited by significantly free agents, such
agents would make all the necessary free decisions to ensure that E2 does not take
place. If these possible free creatures do not in any circumstances make the
requisite decisions, then the better world in question cannot eventuate, and so
even God would be powerless to bring it about. This, however, overlooks that fact
that God could, as in Rowe’s hypothetical scenario, directly intervene to prevent
E2. Furthermore, even if it is granted that we do not know which better worlds
God can actualize, it seems implausible that God cannot actualize any of them.
Durston’s response to this line of thought is startling. ‘We are mistaken’, he
writes, ‘ if we believe that we can think of a better world’.13 He bases this position
on the following considerations drawn from the complexity of history:
(A) We do not have sufficient knowledge of the world’s causal chains
and individual effects to know what this world is like to the end
of history. If we do not know what this world is like to the end of
history, then it is impossible for us to compare it to other worlds
to see if they are better.14
(B) The complexity of history prevents us from knowing what any
alternative world would be like to the end of its history if we deleted
just one event.15
In response to (A), suppose that there are two possible worlds, W1 and W2, with
the former being actual and containing E2 while the latter being merely possible
and lacking E2. Suppose further that W1 and W2 share the same past up to some
point reasonably close to when E2 actually occurred. At that point, God intervenes
in W2 so that the little girl dies peacefully in her sleep. We may also suppose that
the subsequent history of bothW1 andW2 is not significantly different. In that case,
contra (A), we can compare these two worlds even though we do not know much
about them. All we know is that W1 and W2 are identical in nearly all respects, and
that is sufficient to judge which of the two is preferable from a moral standpoint.
This response, however, does not take into account the point made in (B). The
foregoing scenario depicted with respect to W2 may be misleading, for as Durston
points out,
Given the consequential complexity of history, when we propose deleting a particular
event from the world, we are actually proposing deleting all the billions of consequences
of the event strewn throughout myriads of interrelated causal chains stretching to the
end of history. The deletion or substitution of just one event is actually the deletion or
substitution of an entire complex branch of history that may be so large as to affect the
entire historical network at some point in the future.16
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Thus, by deleting E2 we may not end up with a world such as W2 whose sub-
sequent course of history is very much like that found in the actual world.
Rather, in light of the consequential complexity of history, it is quite possible (if
not highly likely) that the deletion of E2 would lead to a world with a radically
different future. But if we do not know what the future in W2 would be like,
we cannot compare this alternative world to our world. Durston therefore
concludes that ‘the activity of thinking of better worlds is not an activity humans
are capable of’.17
Durston rightly emphasizes the effects of deleting an event from history, as this
can easily be disregarded when considering the value or purpose of a particular
evil. However, the conclusion Durston draws from this seems to go well beyond
the facts of the matter. Undoubtedly, the consequences of deleting or substitut-
ing E2 from our world would be far-reaching, though it is difficult to say how far
they would reach. Nevertheless, one would suppose that in deleting E2 it is likely
that the consequences would be better than those that result from the actual
occurrence of E2. But even if we assume that in some worlds the consequences
are no better or even worse, surely there are also some worlds in which the
consequences are better. Our lack of precise knowledge as to what our world and
nearby possible worlds are like to the end of history is no impediment to seeing
that at least some nearby worlds would have a brighter future than ours in virtue
of not containing E2.
Conclusion
Durston’s argument, I have argued, is open to two fatal objections. Firstly,
our ignorance of the remote consequences of a particular event need not prevent
us from arriving at an adequate assessment of the overall value of that event.
Secondly, our lack of knowledge regarding the precise implications of deleting an
event from our world’s history need not prevent us from making an informed
judgement about the moral significance of that deletion. Durston, like many be-
fore him, is led to his brand of moral scepticism by holding to unreasonably high
standards of knowledge in the realm of value. This only reinforces the suspicion
that the scepticism of the sceptical theist runs too deep.
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